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Abstract 
 
The Human Development Index (HDI) is a country-level measure of social welfare 
based on national values for average life expectancy, rates of adult literacy 
and school enrollment, and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. Since HDI 
is based entirely on national averages it can provide only limited information 
about distribution within countries. The distribution of access to key 
resources is an important determinant of the effect of health, education and 
income on both individual well-being and on the aggregate well-being of a 
population as a whole. This paper makes a case for the importance of inequality 
to measuring social welfare; presents an original alternative to HDI that 
includes the distribution of health, education, and income in each country; and 
reports the results of this inequality-adjusted HDI for 46 countries.  
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Inequalities in health, education, and income – key components of human development – matter 
deeply to social welfare. The poorest fifth of the world’s population receives less than two 
percent of the world’s total income – while the richest fifth receives more than 80 percent 
(UNDP 1992). In developing countries, almost 60 percent of all births take place with no health 
professional in attendance. In one-third of all countries, 20 percent of the population or more 
lacks even the most basic literacy (UNDP 2005). Yet the best-known measures of social well-
being either ignore distributional inequalities altogether or at best account for only some of their 
effects. 
Per capita income, the most common measure of well-being, is a simple average. Its main 
alternative, the United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) Human Development Index 
(HDI), is likewise based on national averages, albeit for a wider set of welfare indicators. The 
practice of identifying averages with national well-being ignores potential social-welfare 
tradeoffs between increasing averages and decreasing differences in distribution. For example, as 
the rich get richer, average income may increase, but income inequality simultaneously may 
increase so sharply that the incomes of the poor decline, arguably resulting in a decrease in social 
welfare. More generally, measures based solely on national averages record unambiguous 
changes in social welfare in circumstances made ambiguous by changes in inequality.  
The UNDP has done path-breaking work in disseminating HDI as an alternative to per capita 
income – hitherto the hegemonic measure of social welfare – and in bringing quantitative 
measures of human development to scholars, development professionals, policy-makers, and the 
general public in its annual Human Development Reports, the first of which was published in 
1990. HDI measures social welfare by combining average measures of health, education, and the 
natural logarithm of per capita national income (embodying the assumption that as income 
increases its marginal impact on welfare grows smaller). To calculate HDI, health, education, 
and income components are each transformed into index values ranging from 0 to 1, and the 
three indices are then averaged together. 
The rationale for HDI is that average health and education are not simple functions of average 
income per capita. There are two reasons for this. First, health and education have a substantial 
public goods component; they are not private goods, distributed entirely according to income. 
Second, if the privately obtainable components of health and education are concave in income – 
that is, the marginal provision of health and education diminishes as income rises – then 
countries with the same average income but different income distributions will have different 
levels of average health and education. For the latter reason, HDI’s inclusion of average health 
and education goes some way toward capturing the effects of income inequality on social 
welfare. But it fails to account for other welfare-relevant effects of income inequality, as well as 
for welfare-relevant effects of inequalities in the distribution of health and education outcomes. 
For example, inequalities in all three components of HDI may have corrosive effects on social 
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well-being through their association with decreasing social cohesion, increasing violence, or 
increasing environmental degradation.1 Moreover, there is evidence that many, if not all, people 
put some intrinsic value on equality as an end in itself (Sen 1992). 
In this essay I argue that it is both desirable and feasible to reformulate the Human Development 
Index to push the boundaries of social-welfare measurement beyond national averages. The 
paper begins with a summary and critique of the UNDP’s own efforts to measure inequality in its 
Human Development Reports. Next, I explore the impacts of inequality on social welfare in 
greater detail. I then propose a new “Inequality-adjusted HDI,” providing a detailed explanation 
of the necessary data and methodology, and discussing the theoretical underpinnings of this 
methodology. Finally, I calculate this new measure for 46 countries, and compare the results to 
the current HDI. 
 
Inequality in the Human Development Reports 
Early Human Development Reports (HDRs) explicitly recognized distribution’s importance to 
human development:  
Presenting average figures for each country disguises many important disparities – between 
urban and rural areas, between rich and poor, between male and female, as well as between 
ethnic groups and different regions. The HDI should try to reflect how people really live. (UNDP 
1992: 21)  
Lack of data was cited as the only reason for leaving measures of inequality out of HDI (UNDP 
1990:12). 
Today, somewhat better data are available. And where data are not yet adequate to the task, the 
UNDP’s demand for distributional data could help to improve the supply. The HDRs have the 
capacity to shift not only practices for data collection but also the development discourse itself. 
Yet in recent years the UNDP appears to have retreated from its earlier stance. “The purpose of 
HDI is to provide a summary measure, not a comprehensive measure, of human development,” 
the director of the Human Development Report office stated in 2001 (Fakuda-Parr 2001: 247, 
original emphasis). “It measures average achievement and does not reflect disparities and 
deprivation…Though disparities are a major concern in human development analysis, HDI is a 
measure of national average and does not integrate inequality.”  
The HDRs  not only present HDI, but also contain a narrative report on human development-
related themes that vary from year to year. Over the years, the HDRs’ narratives and its statistical 
appendices have contained a number of different measures of poverty and inequality. Of these, 
only measures of absolute poverty and measures of gender inequality have achieved a permanent 
place in the HDRs. Others have appeared in only one or a few HDRs, or as limited examples; for 
example, disaggregations of HDI for subnational groups often have been reported but only by 
means of examples for one or two countries.  
                                                 
1 On social cohesion, see Thurow (1971); on violence, see Birdsall (2004); on environmental degradation, see Boyce 
(2002). 
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Poverty  
In HDR 1996, the UNDP introduced the Capability Poverty Measure (CPM), a composite 
measure of three basic capabilities: being well-nourished and healthy (the proportion of 
underweight children under the age of five); capability for healthy reproduction (the proportion 
of births unattended by a trained health professional); and education (female illiteracy). The 
CPM was designed to place particular emphasis on the deprivation of women because of their 
importance to the human development of families and society (UNDP 1996: 27). 
The following year, the CPM was replaced by the Human Poverty Index (HPI), which measured: 
longevity (the percentage of people expected to die before age 40); knowledge (adult illiteracy); 
and a living standards (the percentage of people with access to health services, the percentage of 
people with access to safe drinking water, and the percentage of underweight children less than 
five years of age). The UNDP (1997: 20) explained the need for HPI stating that, while HDI uses 
a perspective in which everyone’s well-being counts – rich and poor – HPI focuses only on the 
least well-off.  
In HDR 1998, the UNDP (1998: 15) renamed HPI – it is now called HPI-1 and is earmarked 
exclusively for the measurement of poverty in developing countries – and added HPI-2 as a 
measure of poverty in industrialized countries “because human deprivation varies with the social 
and economic condition of a community.” HPI-2 incorporates different measures of longevity 
(the percentage of people expected to die before age 60); knowledge (a higher standard of 
literacy than that used in HPI-1) and living standards (the percentage of people with disposable 
incomes of less than 50 percent of the median); and adds a measure of social inclusion (the 
proportion of long-term unemployment).  
Income inequality 
Most HDRs have reported some measure of income inequality, usually the Gini coefficient, or 
income shares by quintile (see Figure 1 below). Early HDRs also included an “income-
distribution-sensitive HDI” that used each country’s Gini coefficient (G) for income to adjust 
HDI’s income component using a formula discussed in detail below. This measure was first 
mentioned (although without reference to its formula) in HDR 1990. It was included with more 
detail and results for a small sample of countries in HDRs 1991 through 1994, but since then it 
has not been reported. 
Disaggregating HDI 
Different dimensions of inequality can be distinguished in terms of how a population is 
disaggregated. Frances Stewart (2002: 2) notes that most analyses of poverty and inequality 
focus on the individual: they are, “concerned with the numbers of individuals in poverty in the 
world as a whole, not with who they are, or where they live.” In a discussion of the origins of 
violent conflict, Stewart (2002: 3) goes on to distinguish between “vertical” and “horizontal” 
dimensions of inequality: 
It is my hypothesis that an important factor that differentiates the violent from the peaceful 
[countries] is the existence of severe inequalities between culturally defined groups, which I shall 
define as horizontal inequalities to differentiate them from the normal definition of 
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Figure 1: History of Changes to HDR’s Inequality Measures 
Year Income Disparities Gender Disparities 
1990 • Discussion in text with sample of HDI’s 
sensitivity to income distribution 
• Quintile ratios and Gini in tables 
• Technical note table on female and male 
HDI 
• Both female and male HDIs use GDP per 
capita for income measure 
1991 
 
• Table in text of income-distribution-sensitive 
HDI 
• Quintile ratios and Gini in tables 
• Table in text of Gender-Sensitive HDI using 
estimated income 
• 1 gender table 
1993  • 2 gender tables 
1994 • Annex table of income-distribution-sensitive 
HDI 
• Quintile ratios in tables 
• Annex table of Gender-Disparity-Adjusted 
HDI 
1995 • Quintile ratios in tables only • Tables in text on GDI and GEM 
• 7 Annex tables on gender 
• Table in text on burden of work time 
1996  • Tables in text on GDI and GEM 
• GDI and GEM are Tables 2 and 3 
• 2 other gender tables 
1999 • Historical income distribution in text 
• Quintile ratios in tables 
• Bardhan and Klasen income method 
introduced for GDI and GEM 
• GDI and GEM are Tables 2 and 3 
• 4 other gender tables 
2000 • Quintile ratios in tables only  
2001 • Gini table in text 
• Quintile ratios, Gini in tables 
• GDI and GEM are Tables 21 and 22 or 
higher 
• 4 other gender tables 
2002 • Quintile ratios and Gini in tables only  
Note: GDI = Gender-related Development Index; GEM = Gender Empowerment Measure 
inequality which lines individuals or households up vertically and measures inequality over the 
range of individuals – I define the latter type of inequality as vertical inequality. Horizontal 
inequalities are multidimensional – with political, economic, and social elements (as indeed are 
vertical inequalities, but they are rarely measured in a multidimensional way). It is my 
contention that horizontal inequalities affect individual well-being and social stability in a 
serious way, and one that is different from the consequences of vertical inequality. 
Comparative HDIs calculated for specific regions or racial/ethnic groups within countries can 
and have been used to depict horizontal inequalities. A table in HDR 1993 (UNDP 1993: 18), for 
example, disaggregated the United States’ HDI by race and gender: U.S. whites had a higher 
HDI than Japan (the country ranking first in HDI that year), while U.S. blacks had an HDI near 
that of Trinidad and Tobago (HDI rank 31), and U.S. Latinos had an HDI near that of Estonia 
(HDI rank 34).2
Gender disparities 
Disaggregation by gender is the only type of horizontal inequality for which comparable data 
have been reported regularly in the HDRs for a large set of countries. In fact, the UNDP has 
included some measure of female development or gender inequality in all sixteen HDRs (see 
                                                 
2 See also Stanton (2006), chapter 4. 
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Figure 1 above). Female- and Male-HDIs (that is, HDIs constructed as if a single gender were 
the entire population) were reported in a technical note to the first HDR, with GDP per capita 
used for both genders’ incomes because of a lack of gendered income data. HDR 1991 expanded 
coverage of gender inequality, stating that, “Of the many inequalities in human development, the 
most striking is that along gender lines.” (UNDP 1991: 92)  
Both HDR 1991 and HDR 1992 weighted the regular HDI by the ratio of Female- to Male-HDI 
for a small subset of countries, and presented the results as the “Gender-Sensitive HDI.” The 
Female- and Male-HDIs again were calculated using gendered data for life expectancy and 
literacy, and wage ratios and labor force participation rates by gender were used to construct 
gendered estimates of income. In 1993 and 1994, the UNDP switched to a very closely related 
“Gender-Disparity-Adjusted HDI,” which did not use Female- and Male-HDIs as an 
intermediary step, instead, adjusting HDI by a gender disparity factor calculated as the average 
of the female-to-male ratios of life expectancy, educational attainment, and income (UNDP 
1994: 97). 
This approach was further refined to create the Gender-related Development Index (GDI) first 
presented in 1995, the year of the United Nations’ Fourth World Conference on Women, held in 
Beijing. GDI is a measure of human development that takes into account the extent of gender 
inequality in each country (for details, see Stanton 2006, chapter 5). GDI is the only cross-
country index related to gender disparities in human development that has been calculated 
consistently over a number of years. Also since 1995, the HDRs have reported a Gender 
Empowerment Measure (GEM), which measures gender inequality in political, professional, and 
economic participation. 
Non-income inequalities 
With the exception gender disparities, the inequality measures sporadically reported in the HDR 
have been been restricted exclusively to the income distribution, and none have been 
incorporated into the HDI itself. Sudhir Anand and Amartya Sen (2000: 97), the authors of the 
current specification of HDI’s income component, have advocated adjustment of HDI not only 
for income inequality but also for health or education inequality: “Sensitivity to inequality in 
achievements requires that we adjust all three components of the HDI for inequality.”3
Life expectancy – like health in general – is not distributed equally within nations. Hicks (1997: 
1289) notes that, “[T]here is significant life-span inequality, ranging from infants who die at 
birth or before age one, to persons who die at ages over 100 years.” Similarly, there is abundant 
evidence that literacy and school enrollment are not distributed equally within nations.4  
The first HDR stated that all three average measures of human development “conceal wide 
disparities in the overall population,” but that compared to income inequality, the “inequality 
possible in respect to life expectancy and literacy is much more limited: a person can be literate 
only once, and human life is finite.” (UNDP 1990: 12) The argument that health and education 
inequalities are quantitatively more limited than income inequality is correct (as demonstrated 
                                                 
3 See also Chowdhury 1991, Sagar and Najam 1998, and Chatterjee 2005. 
4 Indeed, any rate of literacy or school enrollment less than 100 percent indicates an unequal distribution of 
educational resources where some have received the benefits of education while others have not. 
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below), although the replacement of binary variables, like literacy and school enrollment, with 
continuous variables, like years of schooling, allows for the detection of more inequality.  
In Inequality Reexamined, Sen (1992: 28, original emphasis) nevertheless argues that unequal 
distributions of health and education also have important impacts on human well-being: “The 
extent of real inequality of opportunities that people face cannot be readily deduced from the 
magnitude of inequality of incomes, since what we can or cannot do, can or cannot achieve, does 
not depend just on our incomes but also on the variety of physical and social characteristics that 
affect our lives and make us what we are.” To some extent, the distributions of health and 
education outcomes reflect private expenditures, and hence the distribution of income.5 Publicly 
provided goods and services may be unequally distributed as well, because access to them is 
politically driven and affected by discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, or 
gender. Because inequalities in the distribution of health and education have negative effects on 
human well-being, and are not simply a function of income inequality, they too should enter into 
measures of social welfare. 
 
Why Inequality Matters for Social Welfare 
HDI, the UNDP’s measure of social welfare, is an important alternative to per capita national 
income because it includes non-income dimensions of welfare, and because to a limited extent it 
creates a more distribution-sensitive measure. This section explains what HDI does and does not 
achieve, and why the UNDP should go further in incorporating welfare-relevant aspects of 
distribution into HDI. 
The most commonly used proxy for social welfare is per capita income (Y ), usually measured as 
a country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) divided by its population (N): 
GDPi
iY(1)  = Ni
 
where the subscript i refers to the country. Per capita national income has often been criticized as 
a measure of aggregate well-being for its lack of information regarding non-monetary aspects of 
welfare.6 A further limitation is its lack of distributional information: in two countries with 
identical GDP per capita but very different distributions of income, it is easy to imagine very 
different income impacts on aggregate well-being. 
HDI is derived from three component indices: health (H-Index) as proxied by average life 
expectancy; education (E-Index) as proxied by a weighted average of literacy and school 
                                                 
5 Even when the provision of health and education is public, access to them can be affected by the distribution of 
purchasing power. For example, travel to even a free health clinic may be constrained by lack of income, or 
children’s need to work to support themselves or their families may constrain their effective access to education. 
6 See Ackerman et al. (1997) and UNDP (1990) among many others. 
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enrollment rates; and income per capita (Y-Index), using the natural logarithm in order to 
account for the diminishing marginal utility of income.7  
The concept of diminishing returns in the fulfillment of human needs, was expressed by Alfred 
Marshall (1890, Book 3, Chapter 3) more than a century ago: 
There is an endless variety of wants, but there is a limit to each separate want. This familiar and 
fundamental tendency of human nature may be stated in the law of satiable wants or of 
diminishing utility thus: The total utility of a thing to anyone (that is, the total pleasure or other 
benefit it yields him) increases with every increase in his stock of it, but not as fast as his stock 
increases. If his stock of it increases at a uniform rate the benefit derived from it increases at a 
diminishing rate. In other words, the additional benefit which a person derives from a given 
increase of his stock of a thing, diminishes with every increase in the stock that he already has.  
HDI’s use of the logarithmic transform of per capita income to adjust for diminishing returns to 
income seems, at first glance, to be motivated by Marshall’s principle of satiable wants. Yet the 
utilitarians and early marginalists like Marshall did not discuss diminishing returns to the 
aggregate per capita income of a country, which is what HDI currently takes into account. 
Rather, they posited diminishing marginal returns to individual income. In the same way, in 
modern neoclassical theory, diminishing marginal returns are applied to individual income, not 
aggregate income; indeed, neoclassical theory has no concept of aggregate social welfare beyond 
the notion of Pareto improvement.8 To account for diminishing marginal returns to income, we 
therefore need to use a concave transform of income (such as natural logarithms) at the level of 
individual incomes, a point to which I return below. 
In calculating HDI, the UNDP first normalizes life expectancy, education, and the natural log of 
income for conversion into indices, and then combines the three indices in a simple average. The 
normalization formula causes index values (called the X-Index in Equation 2 below, to 
generalize across the three) to range from 0 to 1, by comparing each country’s indicator value 
( iX , the average value of variable X in the ith country) to a stylized range of indicator values 
among all countries: 
iX  – minimum X value  =  (2) X-Indexi maximum X value – minimum X value 
 
In the current HDI formula, the stylized range for average life expectancy values (LEi) is 25 to 
85 years; for literacy and enrollment rates (LIT  and ENRi i) it is 0 to 100 percent; and for GDP 
per capita (Y ) it isi  the natural log of $100 to the natural log of $40,000.  
The formula for HDI is as follows: 
                                                 
7 According the UNDP (2005: 341), “Income is adjusted because achieving a respectable level of human 
development does not require unlimited income. Accordingly, the logarithm of income is used.” Using slightly 
different language, the first HDR explained the use of logarithms this way: “[Since] there are diminishing returns in 
the conversion of income into the fulfillment of human needs, the adjusted GDP per capita figures have been 
transformed into their logarithms.” (UNDP 1990: 13)  
8 A Pareto improvement occurs when some individual is made better off without making anyone worse off. 
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LE  – 25 years i(3a) H-Index  =i 85 years – 25 years
 
 – 0% LITi(3b) LIT-Index  =i 100% – 0%
 
ENR  – 0%i(3c) ENR-Index  =i 100% – 0%
 
(3d) E-Index  = 2/3(LIT-Index ) + 1/3(ENR-Index ) i i i
 
ln(Y ) – ln($100) i(3e) Y-Index  =i ln($40,000) – ln($100)
 
(3f) HDI  = 1/3(H-Index ) + 1/3(E-Index ) + 1/3(Y-Index ) i i i i
 
The inclusion of non-income dimensions is important for two reasons: first, because health and 
education are in part publicly provided goods, which are not distributed according to income; 
and second, because insofare as they are privately purchases, health and education – like utility – 
are concave in income. As a result of the latter, HDI to some extent captures the welfare effects 
of income inequality. 
Income Inequality’s Aggregation Effect 
Income inequality has been shown to be correlated negatively with the average level of health in 
a society. Daniels, Kennedy, and Kawachi (2000: 3) summarize this relationship:9  
We now know…that countries with a greater degree of socioeconomic inequality show greater 
inequality in health status; also, that middle-income groups in relatively unequal societies have 
worse health than comparable, or even poorer, groups in more equal societies. Inequality, in 
short, seems to be bad for our health. 
In part, this is because the relationship between individual health and individual income is 
concave – that is, increases to income improve health but at a diminishing rate. For example, 
Michael Marmot’s “Whitehall” studies of British civil servants have found a strong inverse 
relationship between social class and mortality from diseases: workers with the lowest status jobs 
had twice the mortality rate of those with the highest status jobs, a disparity attributed to 
differences in the psychosocial work environment (Marmot and Smith 1991; Marmot and Bosma 
1997).  
If health is concave in income, then a redistribution of income would change the average level of 
health. Figures 2a and 2b illustrate this effect. Individual income (Yk) maps into increasing 
individual health (Hk), where subscript k denotes the individual with diminishing returns. The 
frequency distribution along the horizontal axes cause different average levels of health, 
depending on how individual incomes are spread out. In the population of two individuals 
                                                 
9 See also Kawachi and Kennedy (2002). 
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depicted here, the incomes of Person 1 and Person 2 (Y  and Y1 2) are much closer together in 
Figure 2b than in Figure 2a, although average income (Y ) is the same.  
Figures 2a and 2b: The Aggregation Effect of Income Distribution 
Figure 2a Figure 2b 
            
Average health ( H ) is higher in Figure 2b, where income is more
egation effect”: 
 equally distributed. This is can 
be described as an “aggr H = H(Y ) only if Yk = Y  for all k (Heerink  et al. 2001; 
Boyce 2006).10  but different income 
distributions, the country
therefore a lower HDI.  
The same logic applies to educat vidual income and individual 
education is concave: As individual incom
decreasing rate (T
higher when income
A ranking of countries by HDI differ
 If two countries have identical average income
 with greater income inequality will have lower average health – and 
ion. The relationship between indi
e increases so too do education levels, but at a 
ilak 2002; Hicks 1997; Noorbakhsh 1998). As a result, average education is 
 is more equally distributed. 
s from a ranking by Y , therefore, in part because average 
life expectancy and education regi ribution, as well as because of 
the existence of publicly provided goods and ot inants of health and 
education. While these effects m
ster the effects of income dist
her non-income determ
ake HDI a better measure of social welfare than Y , three 
ation);  
                                                
additional ways in which inequality can affect well-being are missing from HDI:  
• The aggregation effects of inequality in health and education on individual welfare (as 
opposed to the aggregation effects of inequality in income on health and educ
 
10 A more familiar example of the aggregation effect concerns the diminishing marginal utility of income: aggregate 
utility (social welfare) is maximized when income is equally distributed. 
Hk
Yk
H2
H1 
H
Hk
Yk
H2
H1 
Y1 Y2 
H
Y1 Y2 Y Y
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• Shifts in the curves relating individual welfare to individual income, health, and 
education, due to the effects of inequality of other welfare-relevant variables that a
accounted for in HDI; and  
re not 
• Inequality’s intrinsic effect as a disamenity.  
tancy and 
edu ti 11 s 
less tha e 
of five, to 
the e
The
in the Sen sense but their relative values need not be the same across individuals, countries, and 
socioeconomic groups. Besides, the ‘intrinsic’ value of a single ‘functioning,’ namely, ability to 
ation measure in HDI, since a unit decrease 
in the deprivation in life expectancy at an initial life expectancy of, say, 40 years is not 
  
If loved ones, and society as a whole, 
feel greater loss upon the death of a child than the death of an elderly person, this reinforces the 
 
s a greater impact on any individual’s 
welfare than the completion of an additional year of advanced graduate studies. Noorbakhsh 
(199
cou  
cou
sam
If in th and education, then for any given 
 distributed (H1 and H2 converge on 
Each omitted effect is described in more detail below. 
Aggregation Effects of Health and Education Inequalities 
Individual welfare can be assumed to exhibit diminishing returns to both life expec
ca onal attainments.  Each additional year of life adds to our individual welfare, but it add
n the previous year; thus, a four year-old who has succeeded this year in living to the ag
 arguably has gained more in welfare than a 74 year-old who has succeeding in living 
ag  of 75. Thus, according to Srinivasan (1994: 240): 
 components of HDI, namely, life expectancy and educational attainment, are ‘functionings’ 
live a healthy life, is not captured by its linear depriv
commensurate with the same unit decrease at 60 years.
Interdependencies among individuals also have relevance. 
concavity at the level of the individual.  
Similarly, and perhaps less controversially, each extra year of schooling adds to our individual 
welfare, but it adds less than the previous year. For example, the completion of a year of primary
school – and the acquisition of basic literacy – arguably ha
7: 519) makes a similar argument: “[T]he early ‘units’ of educational attainments to a 
ntry should be of much higher value than the last ones. In the context of policy-making in a
ntry with 30% adult literacy, improvements in literacy are of far greater urgency than the 
e for a country with 90% adult literacy.”  
dividual welfare is concave with respect to both heal
average level of health or education, a more equal distribution of these results in higher average 
well-being. In the simple two-person examples of Figures 3a and 3b (where wk is individual 
welfare), as health becomes more equally H ), average 
welfare ( w w  ) increases; again, because the relationship between the two variables is concave, 
H ) only if H= w(  = k H  for all k. Implicitly modeling individual welfare as linear in both health 
and education, HDI omits the aggregation effects of health inequality and education inequality. 
                                                 
11 For discussions, see Sen 1981, Kelley 1991, Srinivasan 1994, Noorbakhsh 1998, Cahill 2002, and Deaton 2003. 
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Figures 3a and 3b: Aggregation Effect of Health and Education Inequality 
Figure 3a Figure 3b 
            
Shift Effects 
In addition to these aggregation effects, inequalities in health, education, and income further 
impact social welfare through what can be called “shift effects”: changes in the position of the 
curve relating individual welfare to these variables (as opposed to changes in the frequency 
distribution along the horizontal axis) (Boyce 2006). Figure 4 depicts a shift effect: individual 
welfare (wk) is a concave function of individual health in both countries A and B, but country A 
has a more unequal distribution of health than country B. Two individuals with the same level of 
health (HA and HB) will have different levels of individual welfare (wA and wB) depending on 
their country, for either or both of two reasons: 1) instrumental shift effects, and 2) intrinsic shift 
effects. 
Instrumental Shift Effects 
“Instrumental effects” refer to inequality’s impact on social welfare by way of some other 
variable, regardless of whether or not inequality is seen as bad in and of itself (Ray 1998: 170). 
Inequalities in health, education, or income that have an adverse impact on some other welfare-
relevant variable(s) absent from HDI would cause a negative shift effect – a decrease in 
everyone’s welfare – an effect that is omitted from HDI as currently constructed. 
An unequal distribution of health, for example, may affect the existence and distribution of 
public goods that are created through community labor, as in the case where communities 
disproportionately impacted by HIV/AIDS lack sufficient adults to care for children, either 
publicly or privately. Similarly, the distribution of educational attainment – and not just the 
average level of education – may have a profound impact on the distribution of power in society, 
and in turn on outcomes related to public goods, like electoral participation or environmental 
quality. A society with a broad distribution of education, in contrast to a society with large 
educational disparities, may have an enhanced ability to engage in collective action, take part in 
political processes, and resist misuses of power that erode public goods.  
w
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Figure 4: Inequality’s Shift Effect 
 
To cite another example, income inequality, and the unequal distributio er with which it 
is correlated, can negatively impact environmental quality. There are winners as well as losers in 
every instance of environmental degradation. Boyce (2002: 34-38) posits a power-weighted 
social decision rule: when those who are hurt by environmental degradation are less powerful 
than those that benefit from it, the environmental damage will exceed the “social optimum,” on 
the other hand, when the victims of environmental degradation are more powerful than the 
beneficiaries, environmental degradation will be sub-optimal. Boyce argues that these two 
possibilities do not balance each other out: “The power-weighted social decision rule yields an 
unambiguous prediction: the greater the inequality of power, the greater the extent and social 
cost of environmental degradation.”  
Boyce offers three explanations for this result. First, power correlates positively with wealth, and 
hence with the ownership of productive assets; since industry causes many environmentally 
degrading activities, the wealthy and powerful who own industrial capital more often tend to be 
winners. The rich also benefit more as consumers, insofar as firms pass along cost savings from 
cost externalization to consumers; since the rich consume more than the poor, they will reap a 
of the resulting increases to consumer surplus. Second, too little environmental 
degradation can be easily “corrected,” but too much cannot; shifts over time in the balance of 
t 
 
inequity is strong. Environmental quality and social cohesion again are important components of 
wk
Hk
 
n of pow
greater share 
power will not be able to correct irreversible damage. Finally, rising marginal costs of 
environmental degradation mean that higher levels of degradation have a greater welfare impac
per unit degradation than lower levels. 
Income inequality can also undermine political processes, disrupt social and civic life, exacerbate
crime, and ignite civil conflicts (Birdsall 2004). Thurow (1971: 327) warns that, “Preventing 
crime and creating social or political stability may depend on preserving a narrow distribution of 
income or a distribution of income that does not have a lower tail.” Similarly, Sen (1973) 
mentions inequality’s negative effects on social cohesion, especially where the perception of 
Country A (high inequality)
Country B (low inequality)
HA
HB
wA
wB
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social welfare, but both are omitted from HDI. The impacts of inequality on such variables have 
negative instrumental shift effects that are likewise omitted from HDI. 
Intrinsic Shift Effects 
Inequality’s intrinsic impacts on social welfare can also cause shifts in the curves relating
individual income, health, and education to individual welfare. Ray (1998: 169) re
 
fers to 
“philosophical and ethical grounds for aversion to inequality,” or the negative weight that society 
al 
ers; 
Inequality of health, education idual welfare functions 
because of what may be a univ . According to Sen (1992: 
130), “[A]ll the major ethical theories of social organization tend to demand equality in some 
space – a space that has some basic importance in that theory.” In his earlier work on this topic, 
Economic Inequality, Sen (1973) describes inequality as a departure from an “appropriate” 
distribution, where the appropriate distribution could be based on what a person needs or 
deserves. Intrinsic preferences for equality would cause negative shift effects, or a decrease in 
everyone’s welfare. 
HDI, as currently constructed, thus misses a number of ways in which inequalities affect social 
welfare: the aggregation effects of inequalities of income, health, and education (apart from the 
aggregation effects of income inequality on health and education themselves); the instrumental 
shift effects of inequalities of income, health, and education (again, apart from those of income 
inequality on education and life expectancy), such as impacts on the provision of social services, 
participation in public life, environmental quality, and social cohesion; and the intrinsic shift 
effects arising from preferences for greater equality.  
The Inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI), which I propose below, accounts for these missing 
components of social welfare with four important adjustments. First, social welfare is modeled as 
12places on inequality.  In this same vein, Thurow (1971) describes income inequality as a 
“public bad” and suggests that income redistribution is necessary to achieve a Pareto optim
state if one or more of the following contributes to an individual’s welfare: the income of oth
the process of giving gifts and charity; or the income distribution itself. 13 In the latter case: 
Each individual in society faces the same income distribution. No one can be deprived of the 
benefits flowing from any particular income distribution. My consumption of whatever benefits 
occur is not rival with your consumption. In short, the income distribution meets all of the tests 
of a pure public good. (Thurow 1971: 327) 
, or income thus may enter into indiv
ersal intrinsic value placed on equity
concave in all three components of HDI, not just per capita income, to reflect diminishing 
returns. Second, the role for concavity is extended beyond the average measure for the relevant 
indicators in order to better account for the aggregation effects of inequality. Third, binary 
education variables are replaced with continuous variables, which better depict inequality. 
Fourth, social welfare is further adjusted to account for shift effects due to  instrumental and 
intrinsic impacts of inequality on social welfare. 
                                                 
12 The term “aversion to inequality” is also used by the UNDP (1995) to explain its rationale for the Gender-relat
Development Index. 
ed 
13 See also Birdsall (2004: 297-8). 
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 Constructing the IHDI: Data 
Construction of the IHDI requires distributional data for health, education, and income for two 
purposes: 1) to model welfare with respect to each of these components as a concave function
as to capture aggregation effects; and 2) to construct measures of the inequality for each count
for all three of these components, so as to capture shift effects. (A detailed description and 
analysis of the data used is presented in Appendix A.) The measures of inequality used for the 
latter purpose in this paper are Gini coefficients. When calculating a Gini, the indicator values 
, so 
ry 
for each individual (or each group) in a given country are first ordered from lowest to highest; 
 
 
 for the country would be zero. If on the other hand, only one person in 
the country had any schooling at all, and all others had none whatsoever, the country would 
in 
ight 
he 
e 
Distributional data on health are available for 81 countries; on education for 110 countries; and 
on i
avai
prop
any
t 
then cumulative shares of the population are compared to cumulative shares of the country’s 
aggregate value of that indicator.14  
In the case of educational attainment, for example, a country’s population can be ordered from 
the individual(s) with the lowest education (no schooling whatsoever) to the individual(s) with
the highest education (say 20 or more years of schooling). If each cumulative percentile of the 
population had exactly the same cumulative share of total years of schooling – so that the first 10
percent of the population had 10 percent of the total years of schooling, the first 20 percent of 
population had 20 percent, and so on – the country would exhibit perfect equality in schooling, 
and the Education Gini
exhibit perfect inequality and its Education Gini would be 1. All countries fall somewhere 
between these hypothetical extremes: for example, the first 10 percent of the population m
have only 1 or 2 percent of the total years of schooling. The Lorenz curve, from which the Gini 
coefficient can be derived, represents perfect equality as a 45-degree line emanating from t
origin. The more inequality, the greater the divergence of the Lorenz curves from the 45-degre
line (as shown in Appendix Figures A2, A4, and A6).15
ncome for 113 countries. Altogether, data for at least one of the three components are 
lable for 149 countries, but all three measures are available for only 46 countries. The 
osed IHDI is calculated below only for these 46 countries, a sample that does not include 
 of the least developed countries.16  
In general terms, Health Ginis are relatively low, falling primarily between 0.1 and 0.2, a resul
consistent with the UNDP’s prediction that intrinsic limits of a lifespan result in a more equal 
distribution of life years than of income, on which there is no such limit.17 Health Ginis are not 
perfectly correlated with average life expectancy, but there is an observable trend in that lower 
                                                 
14 For details, see Ray (1998: 188). 
15 For a discussion of the Gini coefficient’s attributes as a measure of inequality see Ray (1998) and Hicks (1997). 
Hicks also makes a compelling case for the appropriateness of constructing Gini coefficients for health and 
education. 
16 Of these 46 countries, Egypt has the lowest HDI rank, 119 out 177, and no country is among those classified as 
ies with high levels of infant mortality were included in the sample, the average Health Gini 
“low human development” by the UNDP (2005). 
17 Although, if countr
would be much higher. 
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average life expectancies are associated with higher Health Ginis. The distribution of Education
Ginis is more dispersed than that of Health Ginis. Lower average years of schooling are 
associated with higher Education Ginis, but there is a substantial spread in the observations 
indicating that average years of schooling do not fully reflect differences in educational 
inequality. Income Ginis have no strong relationship to per capita income. (See Appendix 
Figures A1, A3, and A5.) 
 
Correlations 
alth, 
ini 
 Gini 
e, 
 be justified by the very different ranges of the 
Ginis and the imperfect inter-country correlations among them. By averaging these three Ginis to 
rm a “Human Development Gini” (as proposed below), we can obtain a useful summary 
measure. For example, very high income inequality could be tempered by taking into account the 
 of health and education means that these are not distributed as 
73 -0.391 1.000
Average EA -0.561 -0.885 -0.630 0.512 1.000
Table 1 presents a correlation matrix for the three Gini coefficients and average levels of life 
expectancy, educational attainment, and income. The pairwise correlations between the He
Education, and Income Ginis range from 0.50 to 0.62. Income inequality, therefore, is not a 
satisfactory proxy for health and education inequalities. The negative correlation between G
coefficients and the corresponding indicator’s average value is strongest between the Health
and average life expectancy, 0.91, and weakest between the Income Gini and per capita incom
0.60. The use of all three inequality measures can
fo
extent to which public provision
unequally as income.  
Table 1: Correlation Matrix for IHDI Gini Coefficients and Average Indicator Values (2003)
GH GE GY Average LE Average EA Averag
GH 1.000
GE 0.623 1.000
GY 0.550 0.502 1.000
Average LE -0.914 -0.5
e Y
Average Y -0.779 -0.669 -0.596 0.783 0.658 1.000  
e. 
 
Figure 5 below depicts the within-country correlations of the Health, Education, and Income 
Gini ranks, showing that, with a few exception like Guatemala, there is little correlation of the 
three Ginis within each country. Because the data presented here come from separate data sets, 
there is no way to empirically establish the extent to which the income-poor are also the health-
poor and the education-poor. It is my hypothesis, however, that these inequalities are cumulativ
Marmot (2005: 101) presents evidence from several countries that adult mortality rates vary 
inversely with education levels. Similarly, Tilak (2002: 198) demonstrates an inverse 
relationship between education levels and income poverty: “Poverty of education is a principal 
factor responsible for income poverty; and income poverty, in turn, does not allow the people to 
overcome poverty of education.”  
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Figure 5: Correlation between Health, Education, and Income Gini Ranks 
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Source: Author’s calculations using data from the current study. 
 
 
Constructing the IHDI: Methodology 
Early HDRs, as noted above, reported results for an Income-Distribution-Adjusted HDI (HDIA*)
This measure used the 
. 
Gini coefficient for income to penalize HDI values for the extent of 
income inequality in each country: 18
LEi – 25 years (4a) H-Indexi = 85 years – 25 years
 
 (4b) E-Indexi = 2/3(LIT-Indexi) + 1/3(ENR-Indexi) 
ln($40,000) – ln($100) 
 
[(1 - G Y)*ln(Yi i)] – ln($100)(4c) Y-IndexA*  =i
                                                 
18 Since the HDI’s technique for adjusting GDP per capita for diminishing returns has changed over time, the 
formula presented here combines the HDR 1990 adjustment for income distribution and the current income index. 
 18
 
(4d) HDI A*i = 1/3(H-Indexi) + 1/3(E-Indexi) + 1/3(Y-IndexA*i) 
 
In calculating HDIA*, the life expectancy and education indices thus remained unchanged, but the 
income index (Y-IndexA*) was adjusted for income inequality: before employing the 
normalization formula, the natural log of income was multiplied by 1 minus the Gini coefficient 
for income (GY). Since Ginis range from 0 (perfectly equality) to 1 (perfect inequality), the 
greater the extent of income inequality the greater the reduction to the income component of 
HDIA*, and the lower HDIA* itself. HDRs 1990 through 1994 contained HDIA* results for a 
sample of countries. 
 
i i i] + 1/3[(1 - GEi) * E-Indexi] + 1/3[(1 – GYi) * Y-Indexi] 
ponent indices account, on average, for about one-third of the 
alue of HDI – that is, the three components are very nearly equally balanced. The placement of 
the adjustments for inequality (1 – G) outside of the normalization formulae in Hicks’ HDI B* has 
 study, Table 2 
compares the average weight of each component in the values of HDI and Hicks’ HDI B*.22
                                                
B*Hicks (1997) proposed an Inequality-Adjusted HDI (HDI ) that made adjustments for 
distribution in all three component indices. In addition to the more commonly available Gini 
coefficient for income (GY), Hicks constructed Ginis for health (GH) and education (GE) using 
data for age at death and educational attainment respectively.19 B* In HDI , the component indices
were identical to those used in HDI with one exception: the three Ginis were used to penalize 
their respective index values for the extent of inequality in that particular component.20 Hicks’ 
method of introducing the Ginis into his adjusted HDI differed from the UNDP method 
described above, being inserted into the component indices after normalization rather than 
beforehand: 21
 B* (5) HDI = 1/3[(1 – GH ) * H-Index
 
In HDI, each of the three com
v
the unfortunate side-effect of upsetting this balance. Using data from the current
 
19 Income distribution data by quintile for Hicks’ study was taken from the World Bank, education data from a study 
by Ahuja and Filmer (1995) that broke educational attainment into six categories, and longevity data from the UN 
Demographic Yearbook’s age at death (Hicks 1997). 
20 Foster et al. (2005) have also presented a distribution-adjusted HDI using distributional data for Mexican states. 
The authors point out that Gini coefficients, while excellent measures of inequality in many other ways, are “sub-
group inconsistent” (that is, it is theoretically possible for the income, for example, of one group to worsen while 
that of all other groups remains the same and for the Gini coefficient to fail to reflect the greater inequality). Foster 
et al. instead propose the use of a version Atkinson’s welfare measure for each of HDI’s component indices: W(x) = 
(Σnk=1 xk1-ε)1/1-ε. While Atkinson’s welfare measure is superior in this one respect, it is much less transparent than 
Hicks’ measure or the IHDI proposed here; for example, it would be extremely difficult to isolate the impact of 
inequality on social welfare in Atkinson’s or to describe its implicit social welfare function. Foster also argues that 
Hicks’ measure is problematic because it is unknown whether its three types of inequality are cumulative or off-
setting, but this would seem ups across the three 
measures, Atkinson’s welfare measu
21 The formula for Hick’s In for consistency with the 
current HDI formula. 
22 Despite HDI’s simple form s not equal to one-third 
each because the three indice hown below. The original 
endpoints (stylized maxima and minima) chosen to normalize each index resulted in very nearly balanced shares. 
 to be a problem of data not formula. Without consistent gro
re suffers from the same failing. 
equality-Adjusted HDI as presented here has been updated 
ula, the average share of HDI taken up by the components i
s differ in their average values and standard deviations, as s
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Table 2: Average Component Shares in HDI and Hicks' HDIB* (2003)
H E Y
HDI 32.7% 35.6% 31.7%
Hicks' HDIB* 39.1% 34.4% 26.5%
Source: Author's calculations using data from the current study.  
 
The current study proposes a new Inequality-Adjusted HDI (IHDI) that differs from HDI not 
only in the inclusion of Ginis for health, education, and income – which are introduced with out 
changing the balance among the three HDI components – but also in an adjustment to each 
component to reflect diminishing returns. To do the latter, the indicators for life expectancy, 
education, and income are first transformed (before incorporation in the index normalization 
formulas) into social welfare (W) using the distributional data discussed above: 
 (6a) WHi = Σnk=1 [aHik * ln(LYik)]
 
(6b) WEi = Σnk=1 [aEik * ln(EAik)]
  
 (6c) WYi = Σnk=1 [aYik * ln(Yik)]
 
where LY is life-years  function  for life 
xpectancy (WH), education (W ), and income (W ) are the weighted average (using the set of 
weights aik) of the natural log of the values of that component for k individuals in the ith country. 
he use of natural logs results in individual welfare functions that are concave with respect to the 
IHDI uses the average of the natural log of individual values, whereas HDI uses the natural log 
, and EA is educational attainment. The social welfare
E Y
s
e
T
logged variable.  
of an average value (in the case of the income component). Taking the natural log of Y  was a
way for the UNDP to make the HDI less sensitive to income differences between countries 
it otherwise would have been. This provided an incom
 
then 
plete solution to the diminishing marginal 
utility of income, in that it only addresses differen ional averages and not 
differences within countries. T e al welfare for 
                                                                                                                                                          
ces between nat
aking the averag  of the natural logs adjusts individu
   
But as data have changed whi a o compare HDI across 
years), the component shares ro
Descriptive Statistics for HDI (2
ra
standard deviation 0.065 0.081 0.122
le endpoints have rem
 have drifted slightly f
ined the same (making it possible t
m this balance: 
003)
H E Y
ave ge 0.845 0.920 0.826
Source: Author's calculations using data from the current study.  
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diminishing returns to health, education, and income, and thereby allows the average to reflect 
23the associated aggregation effects.   
The weights (a ) can take different values summarized by the following general case: 
(1/share
ik
)αik
(7) a  = Σnik αk=1 (1/share )ik
 
where “share ” is the kth individual’s percentage share of e total value of that indicator 
rson’s 
d 
tion 
 taking the natural log of the indicator, is analogous to the system of “equal 
weights” described by Ah 1974). The result of the equal weighting system 
is
ttainment, or income) has the same effect on social welfare, regardless of the individual’s 
weight in social welfare. At higher values for α, the individual with the smallest share of the 
indicator would take on greater and greater importance in the social welfare function. This 
weighting system corresponds to Ahluwalia and Chenery’s “poverty weights.” As α approaches 
ik  th
summed across all individuals; that is, when α = 1 the weights are the inverse of each pe
share of the total indicator value for that country. The higher the α, the greater the weight place
on the well-being of the least well-off group, making this weighting system analogous to the 
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke class of poverty measures, in which α = 2 is the most commonly used 
value (1984).24   
When α = 0, the weights the ith country are equal to one divided by that country’s popula
(Ni) for all k individuals; each person gets the same weight. This weighting system, when 
combined with
luwalia and Chenery (
 that a given percentage change in any individual’s indicator value (life-years, educational 
a
indicator level. For example, a one percentage change in the richest individual’s income has 
exactly the same impact on IHDI as a one percentage change in the poorest individual’s income. 
When α = 1, the weights are the inverse of the individual’s share of the total indicator value for 
that country; the smaller the individual’s share of the indicator, the greater that individual’s 
infinity, the weighting system approaches a Rawlsian concept of social welfare in which only the 
well-being of the least well-off member of society is considered in the social welfare function.25
For simplicity, weights such that α = 0 will be used in the calculations that follow. The social 
welfare functions with respect to health, education, and income, therefore, can be restated as: 
(6a*) W  = ΣnHi k=1 [1/N  * ln(LEi ik)]
 
                                                 
23 Correcting for aggregation effects by taking the average of the natural log of income also means that when
comparing between countries, the diminishing marginal utility has alre
 
ady been taken into account. 
ue 
e least well-off.  
 a 
 
24 This rule does not follow, however, for α values between 0 and 1; for those values, higher α values put less val
on the well-being of th
25 Regardless of the weighting scheme chosen, since the data used in this study are for groups and not individuals
small adjustment is necessary. For each group, the individual indicator value is the group’s average indicator value;
the product of the weight and the logged indicator for each “individual” is then multiplied by the number of group 
members before it is aggregated into social welfare. 
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(6b*) WEi = Σnk=1 [1/Ni * ln(EAik)]
  
(6c*) WYi = Σnk=1 [1/Ni * ln(Yik)]
 
he social welfare functions with respect to life expectancy (WH), education (WE), and income T
(WY) are then normalized using the same type of formula employed in HDI: 
WHi – minimum value (8a) H-Index*  = maximum value – minimum value i
 
WEi – minimum value (8b) E-Index*  = maximum value – minimum value i
 
e (8c) Y-Index i = maximum value – minimum value 
WY  – minimum valui*
 
In calculating IHDI, each styliz m  be a little bit more than the 
tual maximum, and each stylized minimum value was assumed to be a little bit less than the 
inimum. This buffer around the actual maximum and minimum was included to increase 
the likelihood that IHDIs calcu e e same end points and would 
erefore be comparable. The specific buffer for each indicator’s endpoints was chosen to 
ed maximu  value was assumed to
ac
actual m
lated for diff rent years could use th
th
26improve the balance of the three component indices in terms of their shares of IHDI.  
Descriptive statistics of the component indicators, including their average component shares of 
IHDI, are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for IHDI (2003)
H E Y
average 0.564 0.604 0.599
standard deviation 0.097 0.196 0.217
component share of IHDI 33.3% 33.5% 33.1%
Source: Author's calculations using data from the current study.  
 
IHDI is one minus the average of the Ginis for health (GH), education (GE), and income (GY), 
multiplied by the average of the adjusted health, education, and income indices: 
(9) IHDIi = [1 - (1/3GHi + 1/3GEi + 1/3GYi)] * (1/3H-Index*i + 1/3E-Index*i + 1/3Y-Index*i) 
Denoting the average of the three Ginis as HD-Gini, and the average of the three components as 
HD-Index*: 
                                                 
 For health, the range was set at five percent less than the maximum and five percent more than the minimum; for 
rcent 
26
education, six percent less than the maximum and five percent more than the minimum; and for income, four pe
less than the maximum and ten percent more than the minimum 
 22
 (10) HD-Gini = 1/3GHi + 1/3GE  + 1/3GYi i 
(11) HD-Index* = 1/3H-Index ex*i + 1/3Y-Index*i 
(12) IHDI = (1 – HD-Gini) * HD-Index*
  
li  social welfare as the weighted average of the natural log of indicator values 
 
on due 
B*
46 45 -1
Source: Author's calculations using data from the current study.
*
i + 1/3E-Ind
This method of including the three Ginis maintains the balance between the component indices.
On average, the elasticity of IHDI with respect to the HD-Index is 0.98 (a one percent change in 
the HD-Index causes a 0.98 percent change in IHDI), while the elasticity of IHDI the with 
respect to HD-Gini is negative 0.34 percent.  
In sum, mode ng
adjusts HDI for the aggregation effects of inequality. Weighting the average of the component
indices by the average of the Gini coefficients adjusts for shifts in the social welfare functi
to inequality’s instrumental and intrinsic effects on human well-being. 
 
IHDI Results 
 Among the 46 countries in the sample, Norway ranks first by the IHDI and Guatemala 
ranks last (Appendix Table B reports IHDI, with comparisons to HDI and Hicks’ HDI , for all 
46 countries). The inequality adjustments in IHDI yield significant differences from HDI in 
terms of countries’ rankings (for examples, see Table 4). 
Table 4: IHDI Results with comparisons to HDI (2003), selected countries
Country IHDI IHDI rank HDI HDI rank
HDI rank less 
IHDI rank
Norway 0.682 1 0.963 1 0
Korea 0.568 12 0.901 23 11
Brazil 0.229 43 0.792 37 -6
Guatemala 0.098 0.663
 
Figure 6 presents a histogram a ; five countries kept the 
me rank, 22 had worse ranks by IHDI, and the remaining 19 had better ranks. The average 
 quite large considering that these are rank 
changes among only 46 countr
 of all rank ch nges from HDI to IHDI
sa
(absolute value) change in rank was 3.3, which is
ies. 
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Figure 6: Histogram of Rank Changes, HDI Rank minus IHDR Rank (2003) 
1 0 1
2 2
6
1
2
7
2
0
2
0 1 1 0
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
-9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 9 10 11 or
e
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
7
8
7
5
3
1 1 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
MBin  
 
 
Conclusions 
The Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI) incorporates several new elements 
that make HDI more sensitive to inequality. First, social welfare functions with respect to health
education, and income are modeled as the average 
, 
of the natural logs of these variables, as 
opposed to the average of the variables or (in the case of income) the natural log of the average. 
This method captures the aggregation effects of inequality. Moving from binary classifications 
for literacy and school enrollment to the continuous variable of educational attainment makes it 
easier to identify inequality in education. 
Second, IHDI introduces the possibility of varying the weights on individuals in calculating 
social welfare, via a parameter adjustment to reflect the degree of emphasis on equality. The 
higher the parameter α, the greater the weight placed on the well-being of the least well-off. This 
option is important for two reasons:  
ation 
the same contribution to social welfare as extra $1 million to someone with an annual 
e of concavity in individual welfare functions.  
• If inequality is i ner 
attempting to maximize social welfare would choose higher values for α with the goal of 
prioritizin inequality. 
Third, Gini coefficients are ces – in a way that 
maintains balance among the components – to take into account further instrumental and 
• The relationship between the component variables (health, education, and income) 
and individual welfare may be even more concave than the logarithmic transform
specifies. Does an extra $100 for someone with an annual income of $100 really make 
income of $1 million? Assigning values of 1 or higher to α would (in effect) increase the 
degre
ndeed considered bad for social welfare, then a social plan
g increases to the well-being of the least well-off and reducing 
used to adjust the resulting composite indi
intrinsic costs of inequality beyond the aggregation effect.  
 24
GDP per capita and HDI are commonly used as measures of social welfare to indicate which 
countries’ policies have been the most effective in providing the best quality of life. When social 
welfare is measured without reference to inequality, these rankings incorporate conceptual 
HDI thus ranks some countries, like Korea, to
flaws. 
o unfavorably, and others, like Brazil, too 
favorably. 
g 
ter illuminate changes in 
social welfare overtime. While the data necessary to calculate IHDI are not yet available for the 
ll set of countries covered in the HDRs, this essay provides a roadmap to a more robust 
measure of social welfare for use in international and inter-temporal comparisons. 
By the same token, when distributional inequalities are omitted from HDI, progress in improvin
social welfare may be overlooked – as may certain kinds of deterioration of social welfare. IHDI 
can both provide a better ranking of countries at any given time and bet
fu
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Appendix A: Data 
The distributional data for health, education, and income used in this study are described an 
ealth 
in 
age groups and the total number of individuals in each group: (1) 
35 to 
ore. 
to the total number of individuals is the death 
e 
ar. On 
ohort 
rthday, but this ranges from 0.2 percent in Singapore to 4 
he computer model is the age to which that group lives 
he Gini coefficient for health was calculated using each group’s cumulative share of the 
 Gini, 0.096, indicating the most equal distribution of 
fespans; Guatemala had the highest, 0.174, indicating the least equal distribution; and Croatia 
ealth Ginis versus average life expectancies. Figure A2, shows Lorenz curves for Sweden, 
analyzed below.  
H
The health data come from the World Health Organization’s Mortality Database, “Table 1: 
Number of registered deaths, by cause, sex, and age.” These data provide the number of deaths 
 given year for each of ten a
under 1 year; (2) 1 to 4 years; (3) 5 to 14 years; (4) 15 to 24 years; (5) 25 to 34 years; (6) 
44 years; (7) 45 to 54 years; (8) 55 to 64 years; (9) 65 to 74 years; and (10) 75 years or m
he ratio of the number of deaths in a given year T
rate for each group. In order to have distributional data for health outcomes for a large set of 
countries it is necessary to use data for the years 1996 to 2003; for each country, I use only data 
for the most recent year available.  
In order to calculate the distribution of life-years in each country, I created a simple computer 
model of a cohort of 100,000 people all born in the same year. The death rate for the under 1 
ear-olds was applied to this cohort to determine the number of deaths in the first year; thy
second round begins with a cohort size equal to 100,000 less those who died in the first ye
average, for all 81 countries for which data are available, approximately 1 percent of the c
ied before reaching their first bid
percent in Mongolia.  
This same procedure was repeated for each of 99 years (using the death rates from the 
corresponding age group), and in the 100th year all of the remaining members of the cohort were 
assumed to die. The number of life-years for each individual is the age to which they live (for 
those who die before reaching age one, this is assumed to be 0.5 years); the number of life-years 
for each of the 101 groups created by t
multiplied by the number of individuals in that group. The total number of life years for an entire 
country is the sum of the 101 groups’ life years.27
T
population and each group’s cumulative share of total life years. Among the sample of 46 
countries, Sweden had the lowest Health
li
(along with Slovenia) has the median Health Gini, 0.112. Figure A1 below is a scatterplot of 
H
Guatemala, and Croatia. Years of data, death rates, and Health Ginis for all 46 countries are 
reported in Table A1. 
 
                                                 
27 For the purposes of this paper, I relied only on the World Health Organization’s age specific mortality data, but in 
rinciple it would be possible to construct data for most countries using census data on birthrates and the age 
structure of the population, making these data available for a larger set of countries.  
p
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Education 
In calculating IHDI, the binary classifications used to measure education in HDI (literacy and 
school enrollment) are replaced with 
28
a continuous variable, educational attainment measured as 
ears of schooling.  The data for education come from two sources. The percentage of the 
 the 
verage years of schooling come from the World Bank, EdStats, Thematic Data, “Education 
 
; (2) some primary school; (3) completed 
rimary school; (4) some secondary school; (5) completed secondary school; (6) some tertiary 
 secondary school 
ome from the World Bank, EdStats, Global Country Data, “Duration of Education Primary and 
 country’s population in the seven groups described above 
der to estimate the average number of years of schooling 
ade:  
population. 
e 
 or tertiary levels is unknown, I assume that, within each country, 
 a single ratio of “some” 
to “completed” for each country.29 
The Gini coefficient for education was calculated using the cumulative share of each country’s 
population in each of seven groups and the cumulative share of each group’s total years of 
schooling. Among the 46 countries in the sample, Norway had the lowest Education Gini, 0.115, 
indicating the most equal distribution of schooling; Guatemala had the highest, 0.527, indicating 
the least equal distribution; and France (together with Uruguay) has the median Education Gini, 
0.271. Figure A3 is a scatterplot of Education Ginis versus average years of schooling. Figure A4 
shows Lorenz curves for Norway, Guatemala, and France. Cumulative shares of the population, 
                                                
y
population in each country that has reached a given level of education (but no higher), and
a
Attainment in the Adult Population” (also called the Barro-Lee Data Set) for 2000. This source
reports seven levels of achievement: (1) no schooling
p
school; and (7) completed tertiary school. Data on the duration of primary and
c
Secondary” for 2000.  
hese data provide the share of eachT
and the average number of years of schooling for three of the groups – no schooling, completed 
primary, and completed secondary. In or
y country for the four remaining groups, the following assumptions were mb
1) The duration of tertiary school is four years in every country. 
2) The average years of schooling for each country is equal to the sum of the average 
years of schooling in each of its seven groups weighted by that group’s share of the 
3) Since the duration of schooling for those students who began but did not complete th
primary, secondary,
the ratio of “some” years of schooling to “completed” years of schooling is equal for 
the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels, and thus solve for
 
28 By dropping literacy, IHDI misses adult literacy programs and other forms of informal education. If this loss of 
information were perceived as a serious limitation it would be possible to develop survey methodology to produce 
data on educational attainment regardless of formal or informal schooling. 
29 For four countries – Bulgaria, Hungary, India, and Russia – the ratio described above was greater than one, 
indicating that the reported average years of schooling for those four countries was not a weighted mean of average 
years of schooling for that group, that is, that some error occurred in the World Banks’ reporting of these data. Only 
increasing the assumed duration of tertiary school to ten to 14 years made the value of “some” equal to or less than 
“completed” in these countries. For these four countries the ratio of “some” to “completed” was instead assumed to 
be the average ratio for the other 106 countries, 0.71. 
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cumulative total years of schooling, and Education Ginis for all 46 countries are presented in 
Table A2. 
me data come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2006, “Table 2.8: 
Distribution of income or consumption.” These data provide the share of income in a given year 
e 
t 
n; and Israel (together with Ireland) had the median Income 
Gini, 0.341.  Figure A5 below is a scatterplot of Income Ginis versus PPP-adjusted GDP per 
 all 
Income 
The inco
for each of seven groups ranked by income, starting from the decile with the least income; th
percentiles in each group are: (1) 0 to 10; (2) 10 to 20; (3) 20 to 40; (4) 40 to 60; (5) 60 to 80; (6) 
80 to 90; and (7) 90 to 100. In order to have distributional data for income shares for a large se
of countries it was necessary to use data for 1994 to 2003; for each country, again only the data 
for the most recent year available were used.30  
Among the 46 countries in the sample, Czech Republic had the lowest Income Gini, 0.244, 
indicating the most equal distribution of income; (once again) Guatemala had the highest, 0.572, 
indicating the least equal distributio
capita. Figure A6 presents Lorenz curves for Czech Republic, Guatemala, and Israel. Years of 
data, cumulative shares of the population, cumulative shares of income, and Income Ginis for
46 countries can be found in Table A3. 
                                                 
30 The individual values of income used to calculate IHDI combine this information with purchasing-power-par
(PPP) adjusted GDP per capita for 2003 from HDI 2005. 
ity 
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Figure A1: Health Gini Coefficient versus Life Expectancy 
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Note: Black squares indicate one of the 46 coinciding countries; gray  
triangles indicates one of the countries not in that sample. 
 
Figure A2: Lorenz Curve for Health for Selected Countries 
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Source: Author’s calculations using data from the current study. 
Figure A3: Education Gini Coefficient versus Average Years of Schooling (2000) 
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Note: Black squares indicate one of the 46 coinciding countries; gray  
triangles indicates one of the countries not in that sample. 
 
Figure A4: Lorenz Curves for Education for Selected Countries (2000) 
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Source: Author’s calculations using data from the current study. 
Figure A5: Income Gini Coefficient versus GDP per capita 
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Note: Black squares indicate one of the 46 coinciding countries; gray  
triangles indicates one of the countries not in that sample. 
 
Figure A6: Lorenz Curves for Income for Selected Countries 
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Source: Author’s calculations using data from the current study. 
Table A1: Distributional Data for Life Years 
18 0.076 0.110
Germany 21 0.082 0.104
Greece 2001 07 0.019 0.081 0.103
Guatemala 1999 0.034 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.008 0.013 0.029 0.107 0.174
Hong Kong 2 0.100
Hungary 0.126
Ireland 2001 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.025 0.094 0.104
Israel 1999 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.022 0.083 0.103
Italy 2001 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.007 0.018 0.075 0.102
Korea 2002 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.009 0.023 0.086 0.108
Mexico 2001 0.016 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.011 0.025 0.080 0.133
Netherlands 2003 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.021 0.088 0.099
New Zealand 2000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.021 0.075 0.110
Norway 2001 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.007 0.020 0.086 0.100
Panama 2000 0.016 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.008 0.018 0.069 0.130
Paraguay 2000 0.011 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.010 0.025 0.094 0.117
Philippines 1998 0.014 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.007 0.015 0.033 0.120 0.138
Poland 2002 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.013 0.029 0.089 0.121
Portugal 2002 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.021 0.088 0.111
Romania 2002 0.017 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.017 0.036 0.109 0.135
Russia 2002 0.014 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.014 0.027 0.048 0.111 0.167
Singapore 2001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.022 0.072 0.102
Slovenia 2002 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.011 0.025 0.083 0.112
Sweden 2001 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.007 0.019 0.084 0.096
Thailand 2000 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.013 0.028 0.097 0.145
United Kingdom 2002 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.022 0.088 0.103
Uruguay 2000 0.013 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.012 0.026 0.085 0.126
USA 2000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.010 0.024 0.082 0.117
Venezuela 2000 0.017 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.010 0.024 0.078 0.142
Group death rate
Country D
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Argentina 2001 0.016 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.012 0.027 0.090 0.128
Australia 2001 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.018 0.070 0.104
Austria 2002 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.008 0.020 0.081 0.104
Belgium 1997 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.009 0.023 0.092 0.107
Brazil 2000 0.019 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.013 0.029 0.094 0.142
Bulgaria 2002 0.013 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.007 0.015 0.035 0.111 0.124
Canada 2000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.020 0.073 0.105
Chile 2001 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.010 0.025 0.083 0.115
Colombia 1999 0.016 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.010 0.025 0.069 0.145
Costa Rica 2002 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.008 0.019 0.067 0.118
Croatia 2002 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.012 0.031 0.098 0.112
Czech Republic 2002 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.012 0.029 0.097 0.108
Denmark 1999 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.011 0.029 0.091 0.108
Ecuador 2000 0.019 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.009 0.021 0.084 0.141
Egypt 2000 0.026 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.017 0.039 0.109 0.144
El Salvador 1999 0.011 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.011 0.022 0.080 0.143
Finland 2002 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.020 0.084 0.105
France 2000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.0
.02001 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.009 0
0.005 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.0
2000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.019 0.06
2002 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.009 0.016 0.034 0.098
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Table A2: Distr
0.89 1.00 0.279
Hungary 0.02 0.78 1.00 0.332
Ireland 0.04 0.14 0.71 0.85 1.00 0.192
Israel 0.11 0.24 0.31 0.57 0.73 0.90 1. 0.00 0.07 0.11 0.39 0.59 0.83 1.00 0.264
Italy 0 1.00 0.352
Korea 0 1.00 0.180
Mexico 0.10 0.34 0.52 0.74 0.89 0.96 1.00 0.00 0.14 0.29 0.54 0.81 0.90 1.00 0.304
Netherlands 0.04 0.15 0.29 0.65 0.78 0.91 1.00 0.00 0.06 0.15 0.51 0.68 0.84 1.00 0.215
New Zealand 0.00 0.13 0.28 0.47 0.59 0.86 1.00 0.00 0.06 0.14 0.32 0.45 0.80 1.00 0.195
Norway 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.32 0.76 0.92 1.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.23 0.72 0.89 1.00 0.115
Panama 0.09 0.27 0.45 0.61 0.81 0.90 1.00 0.00 0.10 0.23 0.40 0.68 0.81 1.00 0.292
Paraguay 0.06 0.48 0.68 0.81 0.92 0.96 1.00 0.00 0.26 0.45 0.60 0.83 0.88 1.00 0.309
Philippines 0.03 0.20 0.36 0.54 0.77 0.88 1.00 0.00 0.09 0.21 0.38 0.65 0.80 1.00 0.219
Poland 0.02 0.06 0.36 0.72 0.90 0.94 1.00 0.00 0.03 0.21 0.62 0.84 0.90 1.00 0.186
Portugal 0.12 0.38 0.61 0.78 0.86 0.96 1.00 0.00 0.15 0.38 0.57 0.74 0.89 1.00 0.332
Romania 0.04 0.17 0.25 0.69 0.93 0.95 1.00 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.58 0.88 0.92 1.00 0.206
Russia 0.01 0.12 0.33 0.66 0.84 0.89 1.00 0.00 0.03 0.12 0.46 0.70 0.77 1.00 0.296
Singapore 0.16 0.32 0.55 0.80 0.90 0.96 1.00 0.00 0.12 0.31 0.65 0.80 0.92 1.00 0.319
Slovenia 0.02 0.29 0.45 0.73 0.87 0.91 1.00 0.00 0.10 0.19 0.50 0.74 0.81 1.00 0.335
Sweden 0.02 0.10 0.17 0.34 0.78 0.89 1.00 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.24 0.71 0.85 1.00 0.146
Thailand 0.13 0.47 0.74 0.85 0.89 0.93 1.00 0.00 0.26 0.51 0.67 0.75 0.83 1.00 0.326
United Kingdom 0.03 0.22 0.39 0.69 0.80 0.91 1.00 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.54 0.69 0.84 1.00 0.246
Uruguay 0.05 0.39 0.50 0.77 0.85 0.93 1.00 0.00 0.20 0.28 0.60 0.73 0.85 1.00 0.278
USA 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.32 0.52 0.76 1.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.22 0.42 0.67 1.00 0.141
Venezuela 0.10 0.44 0.54 0.76 0.86 0.95 1.00 0.00 0.22 0.31 0.57 0.74 0.88 1.00 0.305
ibut
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Argentina 0.04 0.21 0.49 0.70 0.80 0.92 1.00 0.00 0.10 0.29 0.53 0.67 0.86 1.00 0.248
Australia 0.02 0.10 0.20 0.50 0.68 0.85 1.00 0.00 0.04 0.10 0.36 0.57 0.76 1.00 0.184
Austria 0.03 0.14 0.28 0.64 0.85 0.95 1.00 0.00 0.04 0.11 0.47 0.77 0.90 1.00 0.249
Belgium 0.06 0.24 0.41 0.68 0.79 0.87 1.00 0.00 0.11 0.21 0.52 0.66 0.78 1.00 0.256
Brazil 0.16 0.66 0.78 0.88 0.93 0.96 1.00 0.00 0.37 0.47 0.68 0.78 0.89 1.00 0.397
Bulgaria 0.06 0.17 0.44 0.69 0.82 0.88 1.00 0.00 0.04 0.17 0.41 0.58 0.68 1.00 0.385
Canada 0.01 0.05 0.16 0.33 0.46 0.90 1.00 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.22 0.35 0.86 1.00 0.144
Chile 0.07 0.42 0.51 0.74 0.86 0.93 1.00 0.00 0.20 0.28 0.55 0.73 0.85 1.00 0.297
Colombia 0.20 0.54 0.63 0.82 0.90 0.96 1.00 0.00 0.22 0.31 0.60 0.77 0.87 1.00 0.418
Costa Rica 0.10 0.54 0.66 0.78 0.82 0.91 1.00 0.00 0.29 0.42 0.55 0.63 0.79 1.00 0.339
Croatia 0.11 0.36 0.51 0.77 0.91 0.94 1.00 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.53 0.79 0.85 1.00 0.387
Czech Republic 0.02 0.20 0.30 0.69 0.90 0.93 1.00 0.00 0.07 0.13 0.55 0.83 0.88 1.00 0.233
Denmark 0.00 0.16 0.36 0.44 0.81 0.92 1.00 0.00 0.07 0.20 0.27 0.74 0.86 1.00 0.201
Ecuador 0.15 0.48 0.61 0.78 0.85 0.92 1.00 0.00 0.21 0.33 0.55 0.68 0.81 1.00 0.375
Egypt 0.36 0.50 0.57 0.80 0.91 0.96 1.00 0.00 0.10 0.17 0.56 0.77 0.88 1.00 0.492
El Salvador 0.28 0.66 0.77 0.88 0.90 0.96 1.00 0.00 0.35 0.48 0.69 0.73 0.89 1.00 0.447
Finland 0.00 0.14 0.30 0.44 0.78 0.91 1.00 0.00 0.06 0.16 0.28 0.69 0.86 1.00 0.190
France 0.01 0.26 0.47 0.68 0.83 0.94 1.00 0.00 0.12 0.25 0.49 0.71 0.87 1.00 0.271
Germany 0.04 0.13 0.23 0.60 0.84 0.92 1.00 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.46 0.76 0.87 1.00 0.223
Greece 0.05 0.15 0.47 0.60 0.86 0.91 1.00 0.00 0.05 0.27 0.40 0.77 0.83 1.00 0.254
Guatemala 0.40 0.72 0.82 0.93 0.95 0.98 1.00 0.00 0.37 0.53 0.75 0.83 0.91 1.00 0.527
Hong Kong 0.11 0.23 0.37 0.56 0.87 0.94 1.00 0.00 0.06 0.15 0.35 0.79
0.27 0.750.46 0.75 0.88 0.90 1.00 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.53
0.28 0.62 0.79 0.92 1.0 0.00 0.06 0.17 0.470
00
.12 0.31 0.47 0.74 0.86 0.95 1.00 0.00 0.09 0.20 0.52 0.74 0.88
.07 0.07 0.18 0.32 0.74 0.88 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.19 0.65 0.82
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Table A3: Distributional Data for Income 
Cumulative share of pop Cumulative shares of income
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Argentina 2001 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.23 0.44 0.61 1.00 0.504
Australia 1994 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.02 0.06 0.18 0.35 0.59 0.75 1.00 0.341
Austria 1997 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.03 0.08 0.21 0.39 0.62 0.77 1.00 0.292
Belgium 1998 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.03 0.08 0.22 0.40 0.63 0.77 1.00 0.277
Brazil 2001 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.19 0.37 0.53 1.00 0.567
Bulgaria 2001 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.02 0.07 0.20 0.38 0.61 0.76 1.00 0.309
Canada 1998 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.02 0.07 0.20 0.37 0.60 0.75 1.00 0.320
Chile 2000 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.20 0.38 0.53 1.00 0.547
Colombia 1999 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.20 0.38 0.54 1.00 0.551
Costa Rica 2000 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.01 0.04 0.13 0.27 0.49 0.65 1.00 0.449
Croatia 2001 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.03 0.08 0.21 0.38 0.60 0.76 1.00 0.301
Czech Republic 1996 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.04 0.10 0.25 0.42 0.64 0.78 1.00 0.244
Denmark 1997 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.03 0.08 0.23 0.41 0.64 0.79 1.00 0.262
Ecuador 1998 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.23 0.42 0.58 1.00 0.512
Egypt 2000 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.04 0.09 0.21 0.36 0.56 0.70 1.00 0.330
El Salvador 2000 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.23 0.43 0.59 1.00 0.511
Finland 2000 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.04 0.10 0.24 0.41 0.63 0.77 1.00 0.259
France 1995 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.03 0.07 0.20 0.37 0.60 0.75 1.00 0.317
Germany 2000 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.03 0.09 0.22 0.40 0.63 0.78 1.00 0.274
Greece 1998 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.03 0.07 0.19 0.34 0.56 0.72 1.00 0.350
Guatemala 2000 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.18 0.36 0.52 1.00 0.572
Hong Kong 1996 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.02 0.05 0.15 0.29 0.49 0.65 1.00 0.430
Hungary 2002 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.04 0.10 0.23 0.41 0.63 0.78 1.00 0.259
Ireland 1996 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.03 0.07 0.19 0.35 0.57 0.72 1.00 0.344
Israel 1997 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.02 0.07 0.18 0.35 0.58 0.74 1.02 0.341
Italy 2000 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.02 0.06 0.18 0.35 0.58 0.73 1.00 0.341
Korea 1998 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.03 0.08 0.21 0.39 0.63 0.78 1.00 0.284
Mexico 2000 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.22 0.41 0.57 1.00 0.524
Netherlands 1999 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.02 0.08 0.21 0.38 0.61 0.77 1.00 0.299
New Zealand 1997 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.02 0.06 0.18 0.34 0.56 0.72 1.00 0.357
Norway 2000 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.04 0.10 0.24 0.41 0.63 0.77 1.00 0.265
Panama 2000 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.20 0.40 0.57 1.00 0.542
Paraguay 2002 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.20 0.39 0.55 1.00 0.554
Philippines 2000 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.02 0.05 0.14 0.27 0.48 0.64 1.00 0.443
Poland 2002 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.03 0.08 0.20 0.36 0.58 0.73 1.00 0.329
Portugal 1997 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.02 0.06 0.17 0.32 0.54 0.70 1.00 0.380
Romania 2002 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.03 0.08 0.20 0.37 0.59 0.74 1.00 0.318
Russia 2002 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.03 0.08 0.21 0.38 0.61 0.76 1.00 0.300
Singapore 1998 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.02 0.05 0.14 0.29 0.51 0.67 1.00 0.420
Slovenia 1999 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.04 0.09 0.23 0.41 0.64 0.79 1.00 0.256
Sweden 2000 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.04 0.09 0.23 0.41 0.63 0.78 1.00 0.265
Thailand 2000 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.03 0.06 0.16 0.29 0.50 0.66 1.00 0.416
United Kingdom 1999 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.02 0.06 0.18 0.34 0.56 0.72 1.00 0.362
Uruguay 2000 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.02 0.05 0.14 0.28 0.50 0.66 1.00 0.430
USA 2000 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.02 0.05 0.16 0.32 0.54 0.70 1.00 0.386
Venezuela 1998 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.25 0.47 0.64 1.00 0.477  
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Appendix B: Results 
 
Table B: IHDI Results with comparisons to HDI and Hicks’ HDIB* (2003) 
IHDI 
rank Country IHDI HDI Hicks' HDIB*
HDI rank less 
IHDI rank
HDI rank less 
HDIB* rank
1 Norway 0.682 0.963 0.808 0 0
2 Sweden 0.646 0.949 0.787 1 1
3 Canada 0.636 0.949 0.769 1 1
4 USA 0.616 0.944 0.737 3 -4
5 Finland 0.610 0.941 0.765 4 5
6 Australia 0.608 0.955 0.753 -4 -4
7 Denmark 0.596 0.941 0.758 3 5
8 Germany 0.588 0.930 0.745 8 8
9 New Zealand 0.583 0.933 0.726 6 1
10 Netherlands 0.580 0.943 0.749 -2 1
11 Ireland 0.580 0.946 0.741 -6 -4
12 Korea 0.568 0.901 0.731 11 10
13 Belgium 0.557 0.945 0.740 -7 -4
14 Austria 0.556 0.936 0.733 -1 1
15 United Kingdom 0.542 0.939 0.715 -4 -5
16 Czech Republic 0.537 0.874 0.701 8 7
17 France 0.529 0.938 0.720 -5 -3
18 Hong Kong 0.515 0.916 0.670 -1 -6
19 Israel 0.515 0.915 0.699 -1 0
20 Greece 0.515 0.912 0.698 -1 0
21 Poland 0.498 0.858 0.677 6 5
22 Slovenia 0.476 0.904 0.690 -1 1
23 Italy 0.476 0.934 0.687 -9 -7
24 Singapore 0.452 0.907 0.651 -4 -6
25 Hungary 0.436 0.862 0.652 1 1
26 Romania 0.419 0.792 0.621 10 9
27 Portugal 0.408 0.904 0.654 -5 -2
28 Argentina 0.402 0.863 0.611 -3 -5
29 Croatia 0.381 0.841 0.614 0 1
30 Uruguay 0.378 0.840 0.611 0 1
31 Bulgaria 0.371 0.808 0.585 2 -1
32 Chile 0.365 0.854 0.589 -4 -4
33 Costa Rica 0.355 0.838 0.593 -2 0
34 Russian 0.343 0.795 0.589 1 2
35 Panama 0.343 0.804 0.557 -1 -2
36 Mexico 0.335 0.814 0.556 -4 -5
37 Philippines 0.334 0.758 0.567 5 7
38 Thailand 0.323 0.778 0.547 1 1
39 Venezuela 0.291 0.772 0.544 1 1
40 Paraguay 0.281 0.755 0.520 3 3
41 Ecuador 0.241 0.759 0.512 0 0
42 Colombia 0.238 0.785 0.497 -4 -5
43 Brazil 0.229 0.792 0.502 -6 -5
44 El Salvador 0.215 0.722 0.463 0 0
45 Egypt 0.201 0.659 0.455 1 1
46 Guatemala 0.098 0.663 0.385 -1 -1  
Note: For the purposes of this comparison, HDI was reranked out of just the 46 countries in this sample. 
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